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FOREWORD
Drawdowns in Army funding and in the overall
numbers of Soldiers have called attention to the “right
sizing” of the “three Armies”—the Active Component,
the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. As
senior leaders of all three components weigh the various options and discuss the merits of an Operational
Reserve, it is important that they and civilian policymakers consider the necessary reforms that might
have impact on implementing the Army Total Force
Policy directed by the Secretary of the Army.
The authors examine the tenets of the Army Total Force Policy, the details of what exactly the term
“Operational Reserve” means, and the potential obstacles that are currently in place to disrupt successful
reform. The monograph includes questions for senior
leader policy considerations, examples of potential
concerns, and recommendations to help mitigate obstacles in achieving a suitable and workable Total
Army end state. The authors note that the significant
changes created by the Reserve Components’ eventual
integration will demand concomitant significant organizational cultural change by all three components.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish
this timely thought piece discussing the “field” realities of such an endeavor. It is hoped that this monograph will inspire both senior and junior leaders to
recognize the necessity of that cultural shift commencing in the near future.
			
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
As the Army Reserve Components—the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard—assume an “operational” mission as the force drawdowns in overseas contingency operations occur, the Army senior
military and civilian leadership should consider the
ramifications and realities of such a mission in what is
expected to be a relatively peaceful time. This monograph explores some of the considerations regarding
the implementation of the Army Total Force Policy,
identifies potential obstacles, and makes recommendations to better engage the “three Armies” in a successful and meaningful reform effort. Throughout, the
authors call for significant cultural shifts in thinking
about how the Reserve Components are used and
integrated into a Total Force.
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OPERATIONAL RESERVATIONS:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TOTAL ARMY FORCE
INTRODUCTION
The Battle Update Briefing for the theater-level
command post exercise was going well. The Current
Operations Officer, an active duty major, was confident that he had all of the information needed by the
Deputy Commanding General, an Army Reserve (AR)
major general.
“Sir, we have the three detachments of the 999th
MP Company located here, here, and here,” he said,
indicating three different sectors on the map. “Their
primary mission is to secure the main supply—.”
“Whoa there!” interrupted the general. “I happen
to know that unit—Reserves, yes?”
“Yes, sir.”
“When was it mobilized? On whose authority?”
“It was mobilized for this exercise, sir. We mobilized it. It worked well, because the company is already located there in the AO [area of operations].”
“Well, there are a couple problems here, Major.
One, we can’t simply mobilize a Reserve unit without proper authority. Two, I happen to know this unit
and know that one detachment is in Kuwait, one is in
Djibouti, and one is in Kyrgyzstan. How can they just
show up on your map?”
“But sir, they are assigned to us.”
“Then you should know where they are, and it
ain’t there,” the general said, pointing to the map.
“Well, it is just for the purposes of the exercise, sir.”
“Then I suggest you learn the proper way to mobilize and integrate Reserve forces—we need to train
as we fight.”
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“B-b-but, sir, our Reserves are supposed to be
operational . . .”
*****
That incident actually occurred in mid-2012 (although the unit designation and locations have been
changed).1 As illustrated here, there is often a large
disconnect between what Active Component (AC)
and Reserve Component (RC) leaders believe about
what “Operational” Reserve forces can and cannot
accomplish, and how they can be used by Active
Component forces.
Importantly, this disconnect has manifested itself
in a dichotomy between the Department of Defense
(DoD) intentions for an Operational Reserve (OR) and
the realities experienced by the RC. While there has
been tremendous progress in the last 5 years, it is prudent to review the results and challenges of the Army’s
effort toward institutionalizing the OR.
Indeed, the very definition of “OR” is not universally understood, a fact uniformly acknowledged by
the senior leaders interviewed for this project. This is
mainly because its abstract definition lends itself to being defined as whatever one wishes. This monograph
will examine the various definitions and expectations
related to the OR and explore how the concept came
into being. It will also touch briefly on recent arguments that the federal budget can no longer support
an OR.
The monograph will look in-depth at the requirements of both the DoD’s directive to manage the RC
as an operational force and the Army’s Total Force
Policy (ATFP). A number of potential problems with
ATFP will be examined, and suggestions will be made
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to mitigate those problems. An examination of the
Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model is also
included, with recommendations on how to make the
model more useful for planning RC operations and
training. Finally, we will examine the almighty budget
issue and its implications for the future of the RC.
Throughout the monograph there is a discussion
of the various mindsets and organizational cultures
that permeate the AC, Army National Guard (ARNG),
and Army Reserve (USAR). These have a tremendous
impact on the components’ ability to interact and will
play a pivotal role in determining the success of the
Army’s Total Force efforts.
This monograph will raise more questions than it
will provide answers. Although the report will end
with a list of recommendations, the most essential
takeaway is that the Army must engage in robust discussions about the intent, challenges, and viability of
maintaining the RC as a permanent operational force.
Only then can prudent decisions be made about the
fate of the OR.
BACKGROUND: THE SHIFT FROM
STRATEGIC TO OPERATIONAL RESERVE (OR)
Dating back to the militias that fought the Revolutionary War, the United States has benefited from the
contributions of “citizen soldiers.” Within the last century, Reservists (both USAR and ARNG) were used
extensively in World War I, World War II, and the
Korean War.2
Following those conflicts, the RCs were used less
and were considered to be a strategic reserve—units
and individuals to be called to duty only for the most
extreme national crises. Although some RC units and
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individuals were called up for duty in Vietnam, overall RC involvement was limited. The Cold War was
conducted almost exclusively with active duty units,
with only occasional RC training missions to Europe
and Korea.3
The role of the RC began to change in 1990, when
both USAR and National Guard (NG) units were
called up for Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM. The majority of RC units deployed were
combat support and service support, but a number of
RC combat units were also mobilized. Despite some
concern about units that were not able to deploy
due to training issues, those units that did deploy
performed well.4
After their proven performance in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the RC demobilized
and reverted to being a strategic reserve. Overseas
training deployments increased somewhat,5 but RC
units were once again resourced against the assumption that they would not be called upon for service any
time soon.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11),
the nation was galvanized and patriotism flourished.
Both civilians and Soldiers asked, “What can I do to
help?” Predictably, RC Soldiers and leaders wanted
to help with the effort against al-Qaeda, fight for their
country, and “get in the game.”
Post-9/11 RC mobilizations began with thousands
of RC Soldiers providing security at airports and
critical infrastructure in support of Operation NOBLE
EAGLE. As AC forces headed to Afghanistan to begin
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Reservists
were also mobilized to fill training base slots in the
United States.
As the United States expanded its operations in
Afghanistan, RC forces began joining the AC over4

seas. While the early deployment of RC forces to OEF
was somewhat limited, RC deployments steadily increased. RC contributions to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) were significant from the start. RC units
were a part of the initial assault into Iraq in March
2003, and AC/RC deployments rose and fell in proportion throughout OIF. RC units blended with AC
forces to provide a strong and balanced American
force in Iraq.6
In total, over 800,000 RC Soldiers of all services
served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those, over 533,000
were ARNG and USAR.7 Of particular note were the
contributions of civil affairs, water purification, mail
handling, psychological operations, military history,
and Enemy Prisoner of War processing units, which
came almost exclusively from the RC.8 Because those
capabilities were largely absent from the AC, it was
assumed that RC units would be included routinely in
future operational endeavors.9
As the frequency and scale of RC deployments
increased in both Afghanistan and Iraq, military and
civilian leaders began viewing the RC with a different
lens. The RC was recognized for having well-trained
units, critical specialties, and motivated Soldiers who
could be used in a variety of missions and roles. Although there was not a formal plan to do so, the RC
became an operational force; this meant they were
made more readily available for a sustained period
of time than had been planned under the strategic
reserve construct. By 2005, Army planners began acknowledging that the RC would be used as an operational, rather than just strategic, force.10
Later in 2005, the nation was reminded of its dependence on RC forces to respond to domestic emergencies; over 50,000 of the 72,000 responders to Hurricane Katrina were RC personnel. Much to the RC’s
5

chagrin, however, the comprehensive NG and USAR
response was overshadowed by the AC. Despite the
presence of thousands of National Guardsmen in
New Orleans, the arrival of Lieutenant General Russel Honore (the AC First Army Commander) and the
82nd Airborne Division created such a media frenzy
that many people believed that AC forces were the
only ones responding to the crisis. The presence of
National Guardsmen and Reservists from multiple
states was ignored.11
The press did not seem to realize that the active
duty troops, limited by Posse Comitatus, were used
mainly for presence patrols in relatively secure areas
of the city. National Guardsmen, with broader law
enforcement authority, provided backup to the beleaguered New Orleans Police Department, evacuated
the Superdome, and patrolled the more dangerous
areas of the city.12
Ironically, the civilian media were not alone in
portraying the AC as the main force involved in Katrina. The U.S. Army Military History Institute, in its
summary of the Army’s response to the hurricane,
published a glowing account of the AC’s contributions in The Army Response to Hurricane Katrina. The
NG received only three sentences in the entire article;
the USAR received none.13 Even the Louisiana NG,
which continued operations despite its headquarters
being flooded, was ignored in the report.14 There was
no mention of the RC Soldiers who responded, despite
being victims themselves;15 the 17,000 rescues done
by RC troops;16 or the Louisiana National Guard’s
Joint Task Force Gator, which stayed on duty for
3 1/2 years after the hurricane to provide additional
security in New Orleans.17 The RC, it seemed from the
Army’s report, was still considered to be just a backup
to the AC.
6

Despite RC Soldiers’ frustration at having their
contributions minimized, it was obvious that RC units
were needed for the Army to continue fighting two
wars and to keep the homeland safe. Discussions began in-depth to consider the future role of the RC.
In January 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
issued a memorandum entitled Utilization of the Total Force to address his concerns about “whether we
have the right policies to govern how we utilize members of the Reserve, National Guard, and our Active
Components [sic] units.”18 The memorandum limited
RC mobilizations to 1 year (with certain exceptions)
and directed that involuntary mobilizations should
be managed on a unit basis to maintain cohesion and
predictability for RC units. The memorandum further
instructed the services to strive for a 1:2 Deployed:
Dwell ratio for AC and 1:5 year Mobilized: Dwell ratio
for RC. Secretary Gates acknowledged the challenges of frequent and multiple deployments but stated,
“Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in
this time of national need, so we must ask more of our
Reserve components.”19
The year 2008 was a watershed for the RC. The
year began with a final report from the Commission
on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR)20—a report that strongly recommended recognizing and resourcing the RC as an operational force and finished
with the DoD issuing a directive entitled “Managing
the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.”21
The CNGR report, Transforming the National Guard
and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force, was
based on 3 years of extensive research, analysis, and
forecasting to determine the best use of RC forces
in the future. The CNGR determined that the Army
would be unable to sustain future operations without
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extensive involvement by the RC and recommended
that the DoD formally create a sustainable and adequately resourced OR.22
The CNGR’s final report gave almost 100 recommendations in six major categories: (1) Creating a
Sustainable OR; (2) Enhancing the DoD’s Role in the
Homeland; (3) Creating a Continuum of Service; (4)
Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available OR; (5)
Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employers; and (6) Reforming the Organizations and Institutions that Support an OR.23 Although many of the
commission’s recommendations have yet to be acted
upon, the CNGR report was a critical work in defining
what was needed to operate and maintain the RC as
an operational force.
Following a 9-month review of the CNGR report,
the DoD issued Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve
Component as an Operational Force.24 The directive’s
stated purpose was “establishing the overarching set
of principles and policies to promote and support
the management of the RC as an operational force.”25
The directive was considered a victory by RC leaders, and established the expectation of new policies,
rules, funding mechanisms, and programs to institutionalize the OR.
Unfortunately, the directive did not come with
plans or large pots of funding attached. A year after
the directive was issued, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued two reports to congressional committees that emphasized the need for more
planning and funding: GAO-09-720, Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve
Component Forces,26 and GAO-09-898, Army Needs to
Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for
Sustaining an OR Force.27
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Over the next 4 years, some progress was made,
but much remains to be done. In 2012, the Army issued an “Army Total Force Policy” (ATFP) directive
that called for the AC and RC to be integrated into a
“Total Force.”28 As with the DoD directive, however,
implementation has been limited by a lack of plans
and funding. Critical issues have yet to be addressed,
and practical measures to institutionalize the OR are
still lacking.
Most significantly, the question has again arisen of
whether it is feasible to maintain a permanent OR. As
troops are pulled out of Afghanistan and the DoD’s focus shifts to maintaining stability in the Pacific region,
does the country still have the resources to maintain
an OR force? Is an OR needed when the United States
returns to a relatively peaceful status? While the full
answer to these questions lies beyond the scope of this
monograph, we will examine some recent indicators
of an uncertain future for RCs.
WHAT IS “OPERATIONAL?”—DIFFERING
DEFINITIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
As the opening vignette suggests, there is some
degree of confusion regarding what is meant by an
“OR.” Indeed, as late as March 2013, one senior AC
commander remarked, “Nobody knows what that
means!”29
Joint Publication 1-02 includes the following as the
official, albeit unhelpful, definition: “OR—An emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established
for the support of a specific operation. (JP 5-0)”30 The
CNGR report cited a working definition (draft) from
the Joint Staff, dated October 15, 2007:

9

The total Reserve component structure which operates
across the continuum of military missions performing
both strategic and operational roles in peacetime, wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies and homeland defense operations. As such, the Services organize, resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard and
Reserve components to support mission requirements
to the same standard as their active components. Each
Service’s force generation plan prepares both units
and individuals to participate in missions, across
the full spectrum of military operations, in a cycle or
periodic manner that provides predictability for the
combatant commands, the Services, Service members,
their families and civilian employers.31

The key aspects of this definition include: “across
the continuum of military missions” (available for essentially all types of roles), calls upon the Services to
resource their RCs as they would their AC units, and
making employment of the RC “predictable.” In other
words, this definition calls for the RC to do anything
and everything to the same standard as the AC, and
calls for the Services to prepare the RC to do anything and everything, and to do it on a specified time
schedule.
The CNGR report took issue with the Joint Staff
definition, stating:
. . . does not answer the basic questions policymakers face: What missions will the National Guard and
Reserves perform in their strategic and operational
roles? How will DoD resource and equip the reserve
components for these missions so they will be a ready
force capable of operating both overseas and in the
homeland? And what can combatant commands,
the services, service members and their families, and
civilian employers expect in terms of predictable
deployments?32
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For its part, the CNGR did little to define the term.
A definition can be gleaned from the proposed reform
objectives, calling for “improving the ability of the NG
and Reserves to meet all threats to the nation as a part
of a total integrated force” and:
a force that is ready, capable, and available for predictable overseas rotations, responses to emergencies
in the homeland, and strategic depth with the ability
to surge when required.33

DoD Directive 1200.17, which mandated the OR,
included the following definition:
RCs as an operational force. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S.
defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full
range of missions according to their Services’ force
generation plans. Units and individuals participate in
missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner
that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families,
and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and
individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such,
the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to
transition to operational roles as needed.34

This “official” definition describes a reserve force
that can integrate seamlessly with AC forces to conduct a variety of missions, tempered by predictability
for the RC. One wonders if the “predictable” aspect
was an afterthought put in to appease those stakeholders (civilian employers, family members, and even the
Soldiers themselves) who do not particularly like the
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alternative—undefined deployments with undefined
time requirements.35
Regardless of DoD’s official definition and goal of
predictability, there is still no agreement on what the
OR should be or how it should be employed. There
appear to be at least two definitions: one each from
the AC and RC perspectives. The AC vision of “operational” embodies deployment for combat-related
missions, largely in support of AC forces.36 The RC
definition of being “operational” includes the idea of
supporting the AC for overseas combat missions but
also encompasses other “real world” missions.
One NG Adjutant General (TAG) described operational forces as performing “any and all missions that
have real world projects and impact, including nontraditional missions. Being operational is more than
deploying.”37 Other RC leaders agreed, saying that
participation in humanitarian, peacekeeping, stability, and domestic response operations helps to train
their units and maintain their mission-capable edge.
With two fundamentally different views of what
the OR should do, it is little wonder that confusion
exists regarding what each component expects of the
other. Recent initiatives to align forces with regional
combatant command theaters may serve to further
complicate the notions of what “support of AC forces”
actually means.
Is it important to define the term “OR” more clearly? Yes. A clear definition will provide a better sense
of what is expected of the RC and allow a common
frame of reference for force structure and resourcing
discussions. Until all components agree and understand what the “OR” should be, animosity and “turf
wars” will continue to plague the Army.
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Perhaps the true issue is the fact that there are three
“Armies”: the AC, the NG, and the Army Reserve.
Each one views issues first from its own parochial perspective, then perhaps acknowledges the views of the
other two. Although the Army Total Force Policy provides a start in reconciling this disparity, policy alone
cannot eliminate cultural boundaries. More important
will be the willingness of senior leaders in all three
components to discuss and agree on what the OR
should be and do, then actively seek practical methods to integrate the force. One of these methods must
include attacking the cultural mindsets manifested by
the leaders in each component.
WHY AN OR?
The question of why there should be an OR was
never really asked. The Deputy Chief of the Army
Reserve stated that operationalizing the RC “was the
right thing to do.”38 That was pretty much all there was
to it. In fact, this justification was repeated by senior
leaders in numerous venues. There did not seem to be
anyone in the higher reaches of leadership who advocated any other point of view or potential thought
regarding how this was to be achieved or what this
actually meant. (Perhaps that is why few alternative
viewpoints were raised).
The CNGR rightly explained that the OR concept
sprang out of necessity due to increased frequency of
RC use for both overseas contingencies (in Iraq and
Afghanistan) as well as for homeland-based emergencies.39 The CNGR went to say that the future security environment would be difficult to discern, but
it would be certain to require RC elements working
in close conjunction with AC forces in order for the
United States to achieve its strategic objectives.40
13

The RC has always suffered from a “second class
citizen” anxiety and has eagerly sought relevance from
the nation’s AC senior leadership. Increased usage of
the RC for OEF and OIF was greeted with excitement
by both USAR and NG leaders. Of course they agreed
that operationalizing the RC was “the right thing to
do.” Thus, there was little discourse on what the OR
concept would mean for the future.
Despite senior AC leaders’ public statements of
confidence in the RC, one can still sense that those very
leaders look down on the RC. As the Chief of Staff of
the Army, General Raymond Odierno, stated during
a symposium at the American Enterprise Institute in
July 2013:
You know, the difference between National Guard,
Reserve, and active component is the active component can practice every single day. The Guard gets to
practice 39-40 days out of the year. So if you want a
football team that can do one practice a month and
then have two weeks spring training, versus a force
that can train every single day, there’s a difference.41

Yes, it is a reality that some RC forces will never
achieve the same training levels as their AC counterparts unless funding and resources are diverted to
those forces in amounts comparable to those of the
AC. But statements such as General Odierno’s indicate a lack of knowledge about the innumerable hours
of extra training and unpaid work that RC Soldiers
put into their military jobs. It is a standing joke within
the RC that duty will be “1 weekend a month and 2
weeks in the summer,” as the requirements are almost
always greater. These extra efforts cannot erase the
training gap between the AC and the RC, but AC leaders would be wise to recognize that RC training goes
14

beyond “1 weekend a month and 2 weeks of spring
training.”
Granted, General Odierno followed his statement
by saying:
We need the Guard. We need them. We’ve proven that
over the last 12 years and the Army Reserve. We’re
going to continue to build an Army that is built on the
Total Army concept.42

But what will that Army look like? Will it end
up having an OR, or will the RC revert to being a
strategic reserve?
FUTURE OF THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE
At this time, there is no way to accurately predict
whether the Army will maintain the RC as an operational force or return them to being solely a strategic
backup. Budget cuts will force large changes to the
Army’s force structure and determine the destiny of
the OR.
As General Odierno stated during the American
Enterprise Institute symposium:
So what we should be looking at is what’s best for our
future. So for me it’s maintaining the right balance of
forces. We’ve already taken 80,000 out of the active
component. We’re going to take a significant amount
more out of the active component, based on sequestration. And we’re going to have to take a little bit out of
the Guard and Reserve. It’ll be a much less percentage.
So the overall percentage of our Reserve component
will be much higher than—will be higher than the active component, where before, the active component
was higher than the Reserve component. I think that’s
the right balance. And we’ve got to look at how we’re
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going to employ them, not just rhetoric about certain
parts of the force [emphasis added].
. . . So I think we’ve been working with them very
carefully through all this. We will continue to work
with them. And my job is to make sure we develop
the best Army possible for the future. And that’s what
we’re going to do.43

Regardless of budget issues and limited support
from AC leaders, the RC has continued the push for
the OR. At the Reserve Officers Association’s (ROA)
2013 National Security Symposium, General Frank
Grass, Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), stated:
We need to continue to engage in the operational missions of our services. . . . We have to look like the Army
and the Air Force, and we have to have missions that
get us into the fight so we can continue to grow leaders that can be ready at a moment’s notice anywhere
in the world [emphasis added].44

The last portion of the CNGB’s statement is critical to understanding why the RC wants to remain
operational. Without “real world” missions to continue training RC Soldiers and leaders, the experience
gained in a decade of war will be lost. The RC leaders’
fight to maintain the OR cannot be viewed simply as
wanting to justify their services’ existence. Rather, operational missions are key to maintaining experienced
leaders and proficient units.
Interestingly, attendees at the ROA symposium
discussed the possibility of having a partial OR, with
some units being “operational” and others being resourced at lower, less readily deployable levels.45 This
idea hearkens back to the mid-1990’s tiered resourcing
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when RC units had expectations of their deployability
based on pre-assigned categories. Tiers were developed by considering the type of unit and how likely it
was to be needed for deployment, how well the unit
met its readiness standards, and other factors. In times
of budget restrictions, such a tiered system is certainly
more achievable than expecting every RC unit to be
resourced as an operational asset.
With the wars coming to a close and operational requirements drawing down, however, there is more
friction developing between the AC and RC. Struggles
for resources, relevancy, and mission assignments
color interactions between the components. The AC,
seemingly for budget savings and efficiency, has begun to resume missions that were routinely conducted
by the RC for the last decade. Many ARNG and USAR
units are being off-ramped from future missions for
which they had already begun training. The AC has
taken back ARNG commitments to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) missions,46 the Multinational Force
and Observers peace-keeping mission in the Sinai,
Egypt47and in the Pacific, AC forces are replacing
RC units that have traditionally conducted certain
engagement-focused exercises.48

This concerns RC leaders, who fear that without
real world missions to perform, the RC will, in the
eyes of the AC, once again become irrelevant. As one
ARNG general stated, ‘Without operational missions
for us [RC forces], a reserve component ‘death spiral’
is likely.”49
In reality, budget restrictions will likely determine the extent to which the RC is maintained as an
operational force. Tellingly, Congress failed to act on
a proposed resolution that would have affirmed congressional support for a permanent OR.50 Likewise,
the 2013 Army Posture Statement never mentioned an
17

“OR.”51 In February 2013, General Odierno testified to
the Senate Armed Services Committee that “. . . the
reduction in overseas deployments which has sustained our reserve readiness over the past 12 years
may result in us being unable to maintain our OR.”52
None of these bode well for proponents of a fully
Operational Reserve.
The future of the OR is still a question. Because the
answer may involve maintaining at least a portion of
the RC as an operational force, the remainder of this
monograph will examine the realities of using the OR.
First, we will examine the DoD and Army directives
that outlined the goals and policies for establishing a
permanent OR and Army Total Force. Then we will
examine some of the problems and challenges associated with maintaining an operational RC. It is hoped
that these discussions will assist policymakers in their
decisions about the future of the RC.
DOD DIRECTIVE 1200.17—MANAGING THE
RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN
OPERATIONAL FORCE
The OR was formally recognized in October 2008
when the DoD issued Directive 1200.17, Managing
the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.53 The
directive was a straightforward document that established “the overarching set of principles and policies
to promote and support the management of the Reserve Components (RCs) as an operational force.”54
The directive defined DoD policies (essentially end
states), then assigned responsibilities and specific program taskings (ways) to the DoD Under Secretaries,
Assistant Secretaries, and Secretaries of the Military
Departments. Most significantly, the directive stated:
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It is DoD policy that:
a. The RCs provide operational capabilities and
strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements
across the full spectrum of conflict. . . .
b. The Active Component (ACs) and RCs are integrated as a Total Force based on the attributes of the
particular component and individual competencies.55
Other policies in the directive included:
•	
Homeland Defense and Defense Support to
Civilian Agencies (DSCA) are Total Force missions.
•	The RCs provide connection to and commitment of the American public.
•	The continuum of service is utilized to enhance
and sustain the all-volunteer force with flexible
service options. . . .
•	Utilization rules enhancing predictability and
prudent use of the RCs are implemented to
govern frequency and duration of activations,
while acknowledging that “expectation management is critical to the success of the management of the operational force.”56
•	Voluntary duty (per Titles 10 and 32 U.S. Code)
is encouraged to meet mission requirements.
•	RCs are resourced to meet readiness requirements, and tracking mechanisms are in place to
provide visibility of resourcing efforts.
•	
Outreach services for RC members, their
families, and employers are established
and available from pre-activation through
reintegration.57
In an enclosure to the directive, DoD assigned specific responsibilities and outlined numerous program
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expectations. Importantly, the first tasking was to ensure that “DoD policies support the planning, organization, and utilization of the RCs to provide operational capabilities and strategic depth across the full
spectrum of conflict.”58 Two significant points were
addressed here: The RC was to perform both operational and strategic roles, and the RC was to be used in
missions across the full spectrum of conflict. Instead
of being considered only as a backup for large-scale
combat operations, RC units were also to be used for
noncombat and nontraditional missions; peacekeeping, stability operations, etc.
Another significant responsibility assigned to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness was ensuring that:
total force policies encourage optimum integration
of AC and RC personnel to provide the most efficient training opportunities to all personnel, allow for
shared use of resources, and provide the most operational benefits and mission capability.59

Additionally, the office was charged with ensuring that “total force assignment policies encourage the
consideration of RC members to serve in key senior
leadership positions throughout DoD.”60
The responsibilities delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve and Personnel Affairs
included developing “policies for managing the RCs
as an operational force, which is a necessity in an era
of persistent conflict and global engagement;” “policies that promote use of total force capabilities in support of domestic disaster without interference with
core defense missions;”61 and “sufficient guidance . . .
to guide Service implementation of the continuum of
service concept.”62
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Finally, the Secretaries of the Military Departments were directed to “implement the provisions of
this Directive” and “manage their respective RCs as
an operational force such that the RCs provide operational capabilities while maintaining strategic depth
. . . across the full spectrum of conflict.”63
The directive’s enclosure detailed five pages of requirements to ensure that DoD provided an RC force
“available for missions in accordance with the national
defense strategy”—a rather broad goal. The OR force
was also to have “capabilities useful for domestic
disaster response” and “meet operational readiness
requirements as identified by the President and Secretary of Defense [SecDef].” In other words, the SecDef
was calling on the RC to conduct “business as usual”
with respect to being able to respond to homeland disasters as well as to fight in ongoing wars or conflicts.
The Service Secretaries were ordered to “ensure
appropriate level of full-time support personnel . . . to
meet readiness requirements of the RCs”; “implement
the continuum of service construct”; and “program
and execute resources where required to support a
‘train-mobilize-deploy’ construct.” The directive further mandated that “funds for training and equipment
must be provided to coincide with the Services force
planning cycle . . .” and stipulated that each Service
Secretary would ensure “resources are provided” for
medical and dental requirements, equipping needs,
facilities, training requirements, and even legal assistance to support activation of military personnel.64
What the directive did not say was what would happen if those funds were unavailable.
In summary, the DoD was directed to integrate the
RC and AC to form a seamless organization ready and
able to do all things required, and to do them efficient-
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ly and effectively. Unfortunately, the directive was
issued with the apparent assumption that resources
were bountiful. Left unanswered was the question of
what to do if resources were limited. Five years later,
that question still awaits an answer.65
ARMY DIRECTIVE 2012-08. ARMY TOTAL
FORCE POLICY
In September 2012, 4 years after the DoD directed
the Services to use “total force policies,” the Secretary
of the Army issued Army Directive 2012-08, Army Total Force Policy (ATFP). The purpose was to integrate
the Army’s AC and RC as a “Total Force,” which was
“an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities . . . to fulfill
national military needs.”66
The Army Total Force Policy has been hailed as a
“significant step in the evolution of the all-volunteer
force . . . .”67 The authors of this monograph concur
that ATFP is a step forward but warn that the ATFP
has ramifications that were either overlooked or not
understood by its writers. The ATFP directive contains numerous requirements for the RC that are unrealistic and unachievable. Further, there is a seeming
lack of recognition that budget constraints will limit
execution of a significant portion of ATFP’s goals for
both the AC and RC.
Regardless of the challenges, the success or failure of the ATFP will be determined mainly by the
expectations and mindset of the leaders who must
implement the policy. Are the components willing to
educate themselves on the capabilities and limitations
of their partners? Are the components willing to set
aside parochial attitudes and consider the concerns of
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the other components? Are the components willing to
alter their operations to meet the requirements of the
ATFP? Are they willing to change their organizational
cultures to replace component-oriented identities with
a vision of the Total Army?
To determine if achieving the goals of ATFP is
even possible, this section will examine the most critical and challenging portions of the Total Force policy
and suggest ways to mitigate the potential problems.
The ATFP directive opened with several blanket
statements that affirmed current methods of operating
as policy but added the title “Total Force”:
As one Total Force, the Active Army, Army National
Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve provide operating and
generating forces to support the National Military
Strategy and Army commitments worldwide.68
The Army will ensure that the Total Force is organized, trained, sustained, equipped, and employed to
support combatant commander requirements as force
packages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives.69

The remaining policy statements were more substantive and will require significant changes to the
way the AC and RC interact. Although the analysis
raises more questions than it provides answers, it is
critical that Army leaders understand these questions
and develop answers to ensure the success of the
Army Total Force.
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POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ARMY
TOTAL FORCE POLICY
Integration of Tactical-Level Forces.
The ATFP directive stated:
3.c. As appropriate, the Army will integrate AC and
RC forces and capabilities at the tactical level (division
and below), consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s
policies for use of the Total Force. . . . This will include
some predeployment collective training of tacticallevel organizations, including those organizations that
will routinely deploy as multi-component forces (for
example, sustainment brigades and other multifunctional support brigades).70

This tasking can be interpreted in several ways.
For those who support integration of the three
Armies, this is a green light to plan together, train
together, and even form standing multicomponent
units (vice those that were formed only out of necessity within combat theaters). For those who oppose
peacetime activations of the RC, execution could be
limited to “some” combined training, only when RC
units are slated to deploy. This interpretation would
also limit intercomponent activity to those units that
are, of necessity, comprised of multiple components
(i.e., the type of brigade level units that usually reside
in the AR). The goal of this statement, while perhaps
well intended, is so broad that it can be interpreted in
opposing ways.
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Training Integration.
The objectives of the Army Total Force Policy—integrated Total Force packages—suggest avoiding the
“separate but equal” approaches that most of the RC
currently uses. In the struggle to provide unit-based
capabilities, the RC has been largely separated from
the AC, as it trains separately from the units it is
intended to support.
The Army School System (TASS), for example,
encompasses myriad AC, NG, and USAR schools.
Under TASS, most state NGs operate their own Regional Training Institute; course offerings include officer commissioning programs, the Noncommissioned
Officer Education System (NCOES), and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) qualification courses. The
USAR also operates its own schools, with the same
type of offerings (minus officer commissioning).
While TASS has done well in limiting overlap in MOS
courses, there is significant redundancy in officer and
Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) professional development courses.71
More significantly for the ATFP, most post-Initial
Entry Training is usually conducted through separate AC and RC programs of instructions (POIs). In
the past, RC POIs were structured around the RC
training model, which provided for a weekend battle
assembly each month and a 2-week annual training
period per year. The number of slots for RC students
was limited in AC schools, particularly when an RC
equivalent was available. Likewise, AC participation in RC schools was limited because the POIs were
markedly different.72 The Army is developing the One
Army School System to address this, but challenges
have arisen in developing POIs that are appropriate
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for both RC Soldiers (with limited training time) and
AC Soldiers (who can train for as long as needed to
achieve proficiency).73
Likewise, collective training rarely blends the AC
and RC. RC collective training is normally conducted
at the unit’s annual training. Few units develop training plans to include the units they are expected to work
with when mobilized. It would behoove RC leaders to
seek out their AC counterparts and nest their training plans together. The widely different planning time
frames from the RC to the AC would need to be addressed (i.e., many RC units lock in their AT training
sites and objectives 2 years in advance; few AC units
have any idea what they will be doing in 2 years), but
surely progress can be made in conducting multicomponent training.
Multicomponent Units.
It may be that the only way—or perhaps the only
acceptable way—to meet the intent of the DoD Directive is to establish multicomponent units. Indeed, recent pronouncements seem to indicate a fondness for
these constructs by the highest levels of Army leadership.74
Multicomponent logistic support brigades were
widely and successfully used in OIF. Ironically, when
those multicomponent units redeployed and the RC
elements demobilized, the components went their
various ways. It would benefit the Army to reestablish
those unit/component relationships and continue to
develop them with peacetime training opportunities.
To achieve the intended goals of integrating training and developing multicomponent units, planners
would be well advised to examine the successes and
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challenges of multicomponent endeavors in the past.75
Planners should also interview the leaders of units
who have trained with the other components, as well
as those who have trained with other services. Consideration must be given to the vastly different planning timelines and training schedules of the AC and
RC, and units must cooperate in altering their plans to
accommodate each other’s needs.
The issues facing multicomponent units are numerous and complex. As the Army moves toward regional alignment of its RC forces, more multicomponent
units will be formed. For a more detailed discussion of
the challenges facing an RC unit that has already been
integrated into an AC headquarters (the USAR’s 9th
Mission Support Command), an appendix is included:
Integration Experiences of a Reserve Component Unit Assigned to an Army Service Component Command.
Uniform Predeployment Readiness and
Professional Development Standards.
The next requirement contained in the ATFP
directive was:
4. Army Commands and Army Service Component
Commands will ensure that the procedures and processes for validating the predeployment readiness of
assigned forces are uniform for AC and RC units and
Soldiers. Army commanders will be responsible for
certifying personnel readiness and individual training for assigned personnel. Standards for qualification
and professional development will be the same for AC
and RC personnel.76

Effecting this portion of the ATFP may be the
most difficult of all. There are three potential problem
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areas: achieving uniform readiness validation processes, determining which commanders/headquarters will certify readiness, and requiring identical professional qualification standards for AC and RC.
First, it is impractical to require that the same procedures and processes be used to validate predeployment readiness. While AC units have at least 250 days
per year to train and test their skills, RC units normally have only 39 days per year. RC units are authorized
additional training days before deployment, but the
number is limited by the DoD “1-year mobilization”
policy.77 It is unlikely that RC units can be validated
on the same range of skills as their AC counterparts.
RC brigade and division level headquarters are already challenged by the requirement to validate their
highest-level collective skills, rather than testing the
skills they are most likely to use in the theater and
mission to which they are deploying. While AC units
might have the time to validate on multiple sets of
skills, RC units do not.
One OEF-bound RC brigade combat team, for example, was tested on leading a brigade-sized attack,
despite the fact that brigade-sized attacks were virtually unheard of for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Because of the time consumed by that task, the unit was
unable to train on what it would be doing in theater:
synchronizing numerous squad and platoon-sized actions across a large area.78 As the sending unit’s NG
TAG suggested, it would have been worth taking the
risk of not training on brigade-sized maneuvers in order to focus on the missions they knew the unit would
have to perform.79
An additional challenge to implementation of the
“uniform validation procedures” mandate is that
there is no existing standard procedure for RC valida-
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tions. Procedures vary widely from one mobilization
station to another, from the USAR to the ARNG, and
even from one state’s ARNG to another. For example,
some TAGs have aggressively sought to validate their
own units, while others leave it up to the mobilization stations. Many times, RC units are validated in
a piecemeal fashion, with different headquarters and
organizations validating different skills. For example,
an ARNG contingent from 35ID that is deploying
to Kosovo in January 2014 will be validated at three
different training sites: Fort Hood, TX; Salina, KS;
and Hohenfels, Germany.80 Each site’s training team
will likely use different procedures and even different standards to determine that the unit is ready
to deploy.
This policy measure will also prove to be difficult in
that multiple headquarters (i.e., Army Commands or
Army Service Component Commands) could claim to
have primacy for validating units. In the case of units
with multiple headquarters (i.e., regionally aligned
RC units), who dictates the standards? For example,
the USAR’s 9th Mission Support Command (MSC)—
the headquarters for the Pacific Army Reserve at Fort
Shafter, HI—is operationally aligned with and assigned to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the active
army’s Army Service Component Command for U.S.
Pacific Command. However, resourcing for the 9th
MSC comes from U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), which definitely has a vote in deciding what
training it will buy. This is significant, especially if
USARPAC’s validation standards are more expensive
than what USARC can afford to provide. While this
particular unit may be presently viewed as an “outlier,” this same type of relationship will be duplicated
throughout the RC as it aligns and assigns forces to
regional combatant commands.
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Finally, it is naive to suggest that RC Soldiers can
meet identical standards for professional development and qualification. Already, many RC Soldiers
are hard pressed to leave their civilian employers for
extended Army schooling.81 Increasing requirements
(i.e., the expectation that “Before the transition to field
grade, captains should have achieved at least half of
the credits necessary to earn a master’s degree”)82 will
place a further burden on RC Soldiers, their families,
and their civilian employers.
Additionally, resource constraints will make it difficult for the RC to meet the same standards for qualification and professional development. For example,
funding restrictions have reduced the number of seats
available at Officer Educational System (OES) and
NCOES courses. Some schools have, of necessity, prioritized AC Soldiers and limited the numbers of seats
available for RC students.83 RC students often have
to wait longer to obtain a seat and therefore attend
professional development courses later in their careers than AC Soldiers. In addition, some RC courses
(i.e., Intermediate-Level Education and the U.S. Army
War College) may take a significantly longer time to
complete, since the instruction can be spread out over
years instead of months.84 RC leaders, who already get
far less time leading their troops than their AC counterparts, are at a distinct disadvantage when resources
limit leader development schools.
A common answer to the problem—to use Distributed Learning (dL) computer classes to replace resident schools—requires RC Soldiers to dedicate countless hours of personal, unpaid time to complete the
necessary schooling. Soldiers must complete lengthy
online Structured Self-Development courses as prerequisites to attending NCOES courses.85 Although
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strides have been made in compensating Soldiers
for dL hours,86 the majority of these courses are still
completed by RC students on “Love Time” (unpaid
hours). Ironically, RC Soldiers can earn retirement
points for completing Army e-Learning courses that
will enhance their civilian qualifications (i.e., information technology certification courses, business leadership, and project management)87 but earn nothing for
mandated military courses.
Few will argue that a computer-based course can
provide the same depth and training experience that
a resident course can. For example, a Soldier who is
training to become a nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCO can learn technical information online, but a dL
course cannot provide the experience of suiting up in
protective gear and performing the job in a contaminated environment. Similarly, U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-8-2 states:
. . . use of dL is not typically as satisfying for leadership courses and does not provide the social benefits
or professional relationships as that encountered in
resident PME [Professional Military Education].88

While dL fills some training gaps, it cannot solve
all of the challenges of achieving identical AC/RC
qualification standards.
Streamlined Procedures for Mobilizing the RC.
The next portion of ATFP stated:
5. The Army will streamline the voluntary and involuntary call to active duty of RC personnel and units to
rapidly expand and sustain Total Army capabilities.
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While the intention is clear, the practical methods
to effect this policy have not taken shape. Indeed, it
appears the same rules regarding 1,095-day limitations and other prohibitive policies remain in effect.
The approval authorities for moving from one component to the next remain in effect from previous years.
To achieve this goal, planners must examine the myriad after action reports of RC mobilizations over the
last decade. They must extract and analyze the success
stories, while developing ways to address and correct
systemic problems. Finally, the DoD must reconsider
its rules and prohibitions regarding mobilization, and
determine whether they can be changed to streamline
the mobilization process.
Equipment.
ATFP’s equipping guidance was:
6. The Army’s equipping strategy will ensure the procurement and equipping processes enable the Total
Force to perform missions of the Department of the
Army.

This policy seems to suggest, again, no necessary
changes in practice to what is already occurring. The
challenge will arise when wartime budget supplements are gone and equipment budgets are slashed.
The Army made tremendous progress over the last
decade in equipping RC units with modern equipment
that is compatible with what their AC counterparts
have. The ARNG generals who were interviewed for
this project agreed that the ARNG has more and better
equipment than ever before.89 Their fear is that, with
decreased budgets and a potential return to strategic
reserve status, RC units will once again be relegated to
using obsolete and inadequate equipment.
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In the current budget environment, it is unrealistic
to think all RC units can be equipped at the same levels they were under the large wartime budgets of the
last decade. At a minimum, however, the Army must
continue to equip those RC units that are most likely
to deploy. This may not be enough to satisfy RC leadership, but the RC must accept that future budgets
will not bring all units to 100 percent of requirements.
Integrated Personnel and Pay Systems; Continuum
of Service; Joint Opportunities.
The last significant policy issue in the ATFP
directive was:
7. The Army will employ an integrated personnel management and pay system that contains standardized
business processes and authoritative data for military
personnel enabling access to secure and reliable data.
Personnel policies shall incorporate Total Force values
and facilitate continuum of service and opportunities
for joint experiences.90

Two critical taskings are included here: Integrating the AC and RC personnel and pay systems, and
changing personnel policies.
Integrating Personnel Systems.
This is clearly a “pie in the sky” objective for personnel, and pay systems are nowhere close to standardization. Indeed, the AC and RC “systems” comprise a myriad of subsystems and networks that have
difficulty communicating with each other, let alone
operating in a coherent fashion to support Soldiers
from multiple components.
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Instead of trying to integrate existing systems, the
most feasible method of achieving the ATFP’s objective would be to develop an entirely new personnel
and pay system. Of course, integration was already
attempted by the DoD when it tried to implement the
Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS).91 The system, which was supposed
to have integrated the various component human resource functions and subsumed over 90 subsystems,
was plagued by problems and delays. When the DIMHRS experiment was finally cancelled, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen told the
Senate Armed Services Committee, “This program
has been a disaster.”92 DIMHRS’s billion-dollar failure
left the Army with its antiquated human resource systems and little hope for integration in the foreseeable
future.93
The AC, USAR, and ARNG still have largely separate personnel systems. Some computer integration
has been done through the use of the Electronic Military Personnel Office (eMILPO), but its capabilities are
limited. All DD Form 93 (Record of Emergency Data)
and Service-members Group Life Insurance forms are
uploaded into the eMILPO system and tracked regardless of component. But that is the full extent of its AC/
RC interconnectivity. RC Soldiers’ retirement points,
awards, and evaluations cannot be recorded, limiting
e-MILPO’s ability to track a “continuum of service.”94
Continuum of Service and Joint Opportunities.
Little progress has been made in developing a continuum of service. This concept (also known as “Soldier for Life,”) would allow Soldiers to move more
easily between the various Army components (Active,
Reserve, and Guard) to meet the individual Soldier’s
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personal needs and desires. Continuum of service
policies would provide a baseline system of credit so
Soldiers would remain competitive for promotion and
be eligible for retirement from any component. This
goal, while admirable, has not prompted any changes
to current policies.
Indeed, the RC also has to contend with the 1,095day rule, which essentially prohibits active duty service for operational support for greater than 3 years
in a 4-year period95—clearly violating any spirit of a
continuum of service concept. As with many other aspects of having the OR, one must question whether
there is truly a desire to implement the continuum of
service. Without major changes to the personnel systems, this concept will remain merely a good idea.
There is also much work to be done in creating
joint opportunities for RC Soldiers. While joint opportunities are available for those Reservists who wish to
deploy or take a full-time tour, part-time joint billets
are scarce. Other than figurehead positions at large
headquarters, there are few opportunities available
for rank-and-file drilling RC Soldiers to work with the
other services. Ironically, the most numerous joint positions seem to lie in the domestic response arena; each
state has a multiservice team of Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) to work with the NG in
planning and responding to domestic emergencies.96
Thankfully, there is hope that part-time joint billets
will increase with the coming regional alignments of
RC units to geographic commands. The authors recommend that specific effort be dedicated to identifying and publicizing those billets to increase the joint
service experience level of the RC.
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Cultures and Mindsets.
Perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to becoming a
Total Force will come from the cultures and mindsets
of the different components—not just the leadership,
but also the rank and file.
It is clear the ATFP was written to help combat
the traditional perceptions that the RC comprised the
“junior varsity” or “the B-Team”—terms that still get
used today by even junior and mid-grade officers and
NCOs in the AC. These perceptions tend to rankle RC
Soldiers, especially if they have come from a wealth
of experience in combat operations or from years of
AC service (both are very common in the RC). In response, many RC Soldiers have adopted an inflated
view of their own capabilities and insist that they are
just as proficient as the AC. The RC sometimes fails to
acknowledge that is it physically impossible to achieve
the same level of expertise with only a fraction of the
training time.97
Senior leaders in both components have recognized
the strong performance of the RC in the recent wars.
But while the overall acceptance and integration of RC
units have improved, the reality is that the AC policies and procedures still treat the RC as second-class
citizens. We see in the areas of training and personnel
readiness, as well as operational integration within
commands, a disjointed view of the RC. The situation
calls for a mass change in organizational culture—one
that may not be effected for decades.
Another cultural change needed is the recognition
that each of the three “Armies” within Total Force
has valuable, unique contributions to make. The AC
would benefit from recognizing RC Soldiers’ civilian
skills and domestic emergency response expertise.98
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The RC would benefit by more gratefully accepting the AC’s training assistance, rather than chafing
against perceived paternalistic attitudes.
To gain acceptance by AC leaders, the RC needs to
“remove the chip from its shoulder” and stop taking
offense every time a suggestion is made to reduce RC
funding or manning. Leaders in all components need
to recognize that their force must share in the pain of
sequestration and budget cuts. The “our force is more
valuable and therefore should not be cut” arguments
are often rooted in a defensive “us versus them”
mentality and serve no valid purpose in working
out problems.
Us versus Them has no place in a Total Force. Leaders and Soldiers in all components need to examine
their mindsets and discard parochial attitudes. Until
cultures change, the Army will not change.
ATFP—Realistic or Idealistic?
Is the Army Total Force Policy realistic or idealistic? Cynics would say it is yet another instance of
senior leader intent not taking into account the practical reality of what can (and cannot) be provided.
Optimists and visionaries might respond that the
policy represents a viable end state to which all Army
efforts should be directed. The true answer probably
lies somewhere in between. Regardless, it is clear that
the three Armies have much work to do in the areas
of integrating training and operations, personnel, resourcing, and—perhaps greatest of all—expectation
management and cultural change.
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FORCE GENERATION
Mobilization of the RC is normally based on “demand signals” from the AC. When the AC anticipates
a critical shortage of forces to meet its operational
demands, it turns to the RC to fill the gap. When the
available AC forces are sufficient to meet the demand,
RC involvement is considered unnecessary.
The conflicts of the past decade created a strong
demand signal for RC forces, for both current and future operations in the “Long War.” To generate and
ensure the flow of necessary forces (both AC and RC),
the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model was
created and implemented in 2006. The ARFORGEN
model sought to provide a “sustained flow of forces
for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies.”99 It was to increase predictability to combatant commanders—Central Command
(CENTCOM) in particular—by cycling units through
three force pools: RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. This cycling process was to be “the structured
progression of unit readiness over time to produce
trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment. . . .”100
While not perfectly executed, not tied in with personnel policies, and expensive, it is this same essential
process the RC seeks to use for continuing its operational support to the AC—even as we enter supposed
years of relative peace. Is ARFORGEN’s supply-oriented process needed when demand is lacking? More
to the point, is RC support needed when the AC can
already meet its operational requirements?
Lacking a demand signal, it appears the RC is hoping to create demand by publicizing its capabilities,
aggressively seeking nontraditional real world mis-
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sions, and volunteering for a plethora of engagement
and training exercises. Under the Army’s move toward
regionally aligned forces, the RC is placing full-time
RC Soldiers into Army Service Component Command
(ASCC) headquarters to continuously remind the AC
campaign planners and training personnel that the RC
is still in existence and available for duty.
It is unclear that the AC leadership fully embraces
the notion of a RC supplement to the ongoing AC
missions—to include engagement exercises or civil
assistance programs. In the Pacific, the Army has reasserted its AC to indicate to the U.S. Pacific Command
(USPACOM) commander that Army forces are ready
and relevant to support the “rebalance to the Pacific
Theater.”101 While this does not necessarily mean a
complete ousting of RC participants in theater exercises, it certainly means a large reduction in the demand
for such forces.
The looming question is, of course, whether the
Army will be able to maintain the funding that is required to keep RC forces in the ARFORGEN’s readiness cycles. Considering that the mobilizations of the
last decade have been funded almost exclusively by
Overseas Contingency Operations funds, what will
happen when those funds are reduced? If funding is
required from the AC, what incentive exists to siphon
its primary training dollars to RC training, when it is
primarily responsible to train AC formations? These
are questions that have yet to be adequately answered
by the force generation plans currently being used.
If the goal as articulated in the Army Total Force
Policy is to “ensure that the procedures and processes
for validating the predeployment readiness of assigned forces are uniform for AC and RC units and
Solders”102 and that “standards for qualification and
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professional development will be the same for AC and
RC personnel,”103 then the cost to ensure this undoubtedly will have to rise (especially if other factors, such
as healthcare, are added into the mix to make the components more equitable). If the supply of available RC
units remains at its current level (based on rotations
through the ARFORGEN cycle) but the demand for
them drops, is it cost-effective to maintain the RC
units at readiness levels that are not truly required?
RC leaders would point out the efficiencies gained
by using “part-time” forces that can be rapidly trained
and assimilated into the war fight. These efficiencies
have been cited in numerous venues (mentioned earlier), essentially stating that the RC comprises somewhere around 50 percent of the total Army force but
costs only about 16 percent. Opponents would respond that because of the demand to get forces into
Iraq and Afghanistan, predeployment training was
done to a “good enough” standard—one that obviously worked and allowed quick integration into the
two operational areas.
Regardless of how many RC forces are ultimately
committed to operational missions, the Army needs to
decide whether ARFORGEN is still the right system
to use for RC force generation. Proponents emphasize
the predictability and levels of readiness that ARFORGEN provides, while others go back to the question of
whether a demand-based model is the best to use in
peacetime.
The ARFORGEN Model.
It appears the RC wants to continue using the
ARFORGEN model to prepare and mobilize its units
for operational missions, regardless of demand. The
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Chief, National Guard Bureau, General Frank Grass,
recently stated, “One of the best things the Army ever
did was adopt the ARFORGEN model.” His enthusiasm was apparently based on the model providing
predictability and stability for Soldiers. “Everyone is
in a cycle,” he said. “People do need a break.”104
Ironically, many of the lower-ranking generals
who were interviewed for this project were considerably less enthusiastic about ARFORGEN. While
all agreed the ARFORGEN model was a reasonable
planning tool, they expressed concern that its planning timelines were disregarded more often than they
were followed. Numerous examples were given of
units that deployed two and even three times in 5 or
6 years—a far cry from the “1 in 5” predicted by the
model.105 If the model is not going to be followed, they
asked, why have it?
Soldiers question its use, too. Whereas all of the
general officers understood ARFORGEN was just a
planning tool, Soldiers in the field tended to view its
timelines as a promise. When they had to deploy more
frequently than 1 year in 5, some Soldiers viewed it as
a betrayal. They were willing to deploy and “get the
job done” but were disappointed the Army wasn’t following its own guidelines.106
There was also a marked lack of knowledge about
the length of ARFORGEN’s planning cycles. Only one
interviewee even mentioned the steady-state 6-year
cycle that is supposed to be the norm for RC units in
peacetime. Instead, everyone spoke of a 5-year cycle:
RC units would mobilize for 1 year and spend 4 years
of dwell time. Few seemed to know the 5-year cycle
was intended only as a surge—“when demand exceeded forces in the Available Force Pool.”107
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In order for ARFORGEN to be a viable planning
tool, it is essential that Soldiers understand its rotational cycles, guidelines, and limitations. For example,
they should know the ARFORGEN regulation specifies an exception to the rotational cycles for “specialized units belonging to an ‘intensely managed
structure that must maintain a level of readiness that
allows them to be called upon for periods of high demand’.”108 In other words, certain units (i.e., civil affairs, aviation, and special operations units) are going
to mobilize and deploy more often than 1 year in 5.109 If
Soldiers understood the possibility their unit might be
on a compressed rotational cycle, there would likely
be fewer complaints about mismanagement of forces.
By and large, the Soldiers interviewed agreed a
5-year cycle was reasonable for RC units (again, most
being unaware that the ARFORGEN plan called for
a 6-year steady-state cycle).110 All expressed concern
that the necessary readiness levels might be difficult
to achieve if adequate resourcing were not provided
in the Train/Ready years.
There were also RC-specific concerns about the
model’s lack of realism in trying to achieve a steady
buildup of readiness. For example, the ARFORGEN
model posits that changes of command will occur in
the RESET year.111 That is feasible for AC units that
are on a 3-year cycle, but not for RC units with a longer cycle. RC command tours are usually limited to 2
to 3 years, meaning a unit will see multiple commanders and senior enlisted leaders over a 5-year ARFORGEN cycle. This does not bode well for continuity of a
5-year training plan, as each commander will conduct
assessments with subjective criteria, regardless of the
“aim point guidance,” and place different levels of focus on an ever-changing mission essential task list.
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Further, ARFORGEN calls for most individual
training and professional development to occur in the
RESET year. It is unrealistic to expect that this training
will be sandwiched into only 1 year of a 5-year cycle.
Many RC Soldiers are constrained by civilian employment and scheduling issues prohibiting them from
attending OES and NCOES schools in a given year.
Also, new personnel will join the RC unit throughout
the training cycle; those joining in the later years will
need to be trained, especially if they have not been able
to get a RESET year to become individually proficient.
To answer some of the questions about the viability of a 5-year training cycle for RC units, Major General Tim Orr, the Adjutant General of Iowa’s National
Guard, proposed adapting the ARFORGEN model to
reflect the realities of peacetime training for the RC.
Since most RC units are not likely to deploy again in
the near future, Orr suggested maintaining ARFORGEN’s timelines but revising the goals and expectations for what should be accomplished in each year of
the cycle. This could also take into account the varied
probability that units would deploy, laying out more
stringent readiness aiming points for those specialized units more likely to be mobilized.
Orr’s ideas for adapting ARFORGEN were practical, realistic, and easy to implement. They go beyond
the scope of this monograph, but the authors recommend ARFORGEN program managers and RC leaders examine the ideas further.112
As with many other issues, the successful use of
ARFORGEN as a planning tool will be determined in
large part by funding available to resource the plan.
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BUDGETS AND BARGAINS
In January 2013, Chief of Staff of the Amy (CSA)
General Raymond Odierno conducted an awards ceremony and had an informal dinner with leaders and
spouses of the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at
Osan Air Force Base, Republic of Korea. During the
dinner, the CSA spoke frankly about the looming DoD
reductions in budget and basically affirmed that with
the continuing resolution, the Army was “short about
six billion dollars.” He also lamented “sequestration”
and signaled that if sequestration were to occur, then
it would likely mean a “17 billion dollar shortfall, and
if this happens, it will come out of readiness dollars.”
Regarding benefits, he further added that there would
not likely be an “impact to Soldier benefits for at least
several years,” but pointed out that “since 2001, the
cost of an individual Soldier had doubled, with much
of that cost found in health care.”113
One month later, testifying before Congress, Odierno spoke forcefully of the fiscal cuts the Army was
already undertaking under the Budget Control Act
of 2011: about $170 billion over the next 10 years. He
cited the Army’s intent to:
[Reduce] active duty end strength from a wartime
high of about 570,000 to 490,000; the Army National
Guard from 358,000 to 350,000; the U.S. Army Reserve
from 206,000 to 205,000; and the civilian workforce
from 272,000 to 255,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017.
. . [By 2017] we will downsize our active component
force structure from 45 Brigade Combat Teams to potentially as low as 32 . . . In 2014, however, we will
begin significant force reductions. . . .114
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Perhaps one of the most thought-provoking details
presented by the CSA was the minimal reductions to
be allocated to the RC (just 13 percent of all Soldier
reductions). What was the rationale behind making
broad cuts to the AC and civilian work force rather
than the RC? Why not make proportional cuts across
the board? In an environment characterized by drastic
reductions in budgetary resources, why was the RC
spared draconian cuts in end strength?
What Odierno did not say (out loud) was that the
RC is more “cost-effective.” This fiscal reality has been
proven by numerous studies and is touted by RC leaders as one of the main reasons the RC should be maintained at current (or even increased) strength levels.
Not surprisingly, one of those publicizing the fiscal
wisdom of maintaining the RC is Lieutenant General
Jeffrey Talley, the current Chief, Army Reserve (CAR).
In recent testimony to Congress, he stated that:
[a]s the Army’s Federal OR force provider, the Army
Reserve provides a cost-effective way to mitigate risk
to national security, comprising almost 20 percent of
the Total Army for only 6 percent of the current budget, and adds that this is an excellent “return on investment.”115 Then Acting Director of the Army National
Guard (DARNG), Major General Raymond Carpenter,
cited statistics that reflected the ARNG’s 33 percent of
the total Army’s force while consuming only 10 percent of the total Army budget.116

The 2008 CNGR report gave significant attention to
discussing the economic and budgetary environment.
The CNGR concluded that the RC is a bargain: The
National Guard received about 12 percent of the total
Army 2008 requested budget, while the Army Reserve
received only 6 percent, (compared to 66 percent pro-
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vided to the AC, with the remainder going to research,
development, testing, and evaluation programs).117
Despite its small portion of the Army’s budget, the
RC mobilized and deployed in huge percentages and
greater frequencies than originally planned.
The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) also concluded that the RC provided a bargain for national
defense:
[T]he most recent report of the Reserve Forces Policy
Board (RFPB) concluded that while Reserve component forces comprise 39% of the total force, they account for 16% of the costs. It calculated that an Active
component service member costs taxpayers $384,000
compared to $123,000 for his counterpart in the Reserves, which would translate into about $2.6 billion
in savings for every 10,000 positions shifted from fulltime to part-time.118

Critics of these numbers point out that RC formations require more training time to get ready for deployment than AC troops, and that this train-up period could cost more than a steady-state investment.
They also say the numbers do not take into account
the economic impact of RC Soldiers being out of the
civilian economy and therefore may be costing the nation in ways not altogether measurable.
There is also concern that increased usage of the
National Guard in a warfighting role would diminish the NG’s ability to perform its homeland role of
DSCA. Indeed, a state may suffer if its NG Soldiers
are deployed elsewhere while a natural disaster or terrorist incident occurs in the state. This concern is mitigated in two ways: 1) It is unlikely that a state would
ever have to deploy all of its forces at the same time;
and, 2) Emergency Management Assistance Compacts
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(EMACs) exist between states to provide domestic response capabilities for states in need.119
Perhaps the real issue is that the AC does not want
the RC to assume an operational role. Although Senior
AC leaders have publicly echoed the “let’s have an
OR” mantra, they have also more privately expressed
concerns over the concept. Some have mentioned that
mobilization of the RC during a crisis and during a
shooting war is one thing, but a regular, peacetime
mobilization could have drastic effects.
One senior Army commander said in an interview
for this project, “. . . with the localization of the Reserve component, large mobilizations could destroy
a community, take down an industry—that is where
this is fuzzy.”120 This could, indeed, be an issue in certain towns and industries (i.e., law enforcement has a
heavy percentage of reserve component Soldiers), but
one must question whether it is a large enough concern to negate the benefits of having an OR.
The budgeting and resourcing process highlights
the reality that we have three Armies: the AC, the
ARNG, and the Army Reserve. When it comes to decisions regarding manning, equipping, training, and
missions, the three Armies vie for precious dollars to
each serve its own needs. While the Army Total Army
Force Policy directs that the AC and RC be considered as one,121 it is idealistic to think that the parochial
fights for resources will abate.
For example, RC general officers have recently become bolder in directly asking Congress for increased
funding for specific RC endeavors. Are the RC leaders
making an “end run” around the Department of the
Army, “asking lawmakers to do what the Pentagon
may not want done”?122 As one critic noted, “[The RC
generals] want to stay part of the operational force in-
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stead of the strategic reserve because it means they’ll
get much greater resources.”123 He further surmised
that maintaining an operational RC “would also increase pressure for deeper cuts in the active-duty
Army.”124 Are these legitimate concerns, or is this just
another example of the three Armies posturing and
vying for increasingly scarce resources?
At his Congressional testimony in January 2013,
Odierno listed the steps the Army needed to take as
a result of the expected budget shortfalls for Fiscal
Year (FY) 13 and FY14.125 He first mentioned furlough
planning and cuts to civilian personnel; cancellation
of third and fourth quarter depot-level maintenance;
cancellation of “all but one of the Brigade maneuver
Combat Training Center rotations for nondeploying
units”; and “large reductions of institutional training across the Army” (including reduction of aviation
training flying hours; courses on DSCA and military
intelligence; NCO common core courses; the Captains
Career Course; and Intermediate Level Education
[ILE]). Odierno also discussed cuts in base sustainment funds, severe reductions in RC pre-mobilization
medical readiness accounts, and others.
Odierno ended the long list of budget reduction
measures by saying:
Let me emphasize that these readiness issues are not
limited to the Active Component. They will hit the
Total Army. In fact, the reduction in overseas deployments which has sustained our reserve readiness over
the past twelve years may result in us being unable to
maintain our OR.126

It remains to be seen whether Congress will deem
it feasible (or even necessary) to pay for an OR in times
of relative peace. As the Center for Strategic and Inter48

national Studies’ (CSIS) Christine Wormuth stated in
an analysis of the CNGR recommendations on developing the OR:
[These] recommendations will truly make or break
transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a
twenty-first century operational force. . . . [H]owever,
these recommendations come with multi-billion dollar
price tags—a fact that raises the barriers to their implementation very significantly. The financial cost of this
transformation is high, but so is the cost of failing to
make the transformation. Congress and the American
public thus must engage in an explicit debate about
the need for an operational force and how to prioritize
this need against many other competing priorities.127

Indeed, that debate is sorely needed. Without it,
the fate of the OR could be dependent on the actions
of accountants with red pens, slashing items they do
not understand from an extremely tight budget. Our
Army and its Soldiers deserve better.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The numerous challenges surrounding RC integration and an OR suggest the creation of a senior level
working group to delve into the issues and develop
concrete solutions to problems that have been “kicked
down the road” for years. The working group should
have representatives from all three components, preferably officers and NCOs who have both AC and RC
experience, understand the challenges of the other
components, and are willing to engage in robust and
honest discussion.
The working group should address the issues outlined in the following text to develop and recommend
comprehensive, holistic, and viable courses of action
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for the Army’s senior leadership. Emphasis must be
put on setting aside parochial interests and looking
at what is best for the Army as a whole. In this manner, an approach can be found that will best serve the
long-term interests of all components and achieve a
true Army Total Force.
The issues to be tackled by the working group
should include:
1. Define with clarity and certainty: what “OR”
means; the mission(s) of the AC and RC; and the ultimate “demand signal” of the AC to mobilize reserve
elements. Specify what missions can be accomplished
solely by the AC, which require RC assistance, and in
what time frame. Additionally, which missions are
best suited to the RC only?
2. Clarify the mission command of RC units with
respect to alignment, allocation, and apportionment to
AC and geographical combatant commands. Ensure
all elements understand what is meant by these relationships and what the responsibilities are for each
unit. Determine which headquarters will: provide
mission taskings, issue training guidance and validate
mission essential task lists (METLs), approve training plans, provide resources, ensure inclusion with
current operational plans and orders, and determine
availability schedules.
3. Revisit the 2008 report of the Commission on the
National Guard and Reserves. Review the commission’s recommendations and validate which are still
needed to integrate the RC as an operational force.
Develop courses of action to implement the commission’s recommendations.
4. Complete a comprehensive, apples-to-apples
cost-benefit analysis to determine the real costs of an
OR with respect to the levels of proficiency desired (as
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identified in issue 1). Should a high level of proficiency be desired, then provide the necessary resources to
make it happen (noting, of course, that the level of desired proficiency will be tied to the willingness of the
Pentagon and Congress to spend on such resources).
5. Develop personnel, communications, supply,
maintenance, training, and readiness tracking systems
that are identical (or at least complementary) for all
components. Make service in each component “interchangeable” to facilitate the continuum of service.
Although this would initially be quite expensive, over
the long term, such efforts would likely pay for themselves through the cost savings of standardization and
the reduction of three different support networks administering each component’s own method.
6. Continue strong efforts to educate and involve
RC families and employers. Without good relations
between the Army and these civilian support providers, there can be no credible RC.
7. Determine if (or when) it is feasible to require
identical standards of readiness and professional development as called for by ATFP.
8. Seek to make RC access to health and dental care
at the same level as that of the AC, should the determined missions of the RC warrant.
9. Examine the ARFORGEN model to determine
its viability as a model for managing RC training
and readiness in peacetime. Explore the possibility
of maintaining the model but changing the expectations and requirements of each phase in the rotational
cycle to better match RC training realities (per Orr’s
recommendation). Determine what impact geographical alignments may have on the ability of the ARFORGEN model to provide globally available RC forces.
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10. Collaborate with other military services to share
experiences and best practices for integrating the RC.
Form a Joint Working Group to examine the OR from
a multiservice perspective.
11. Develop ways to replace component-oriented
cultures with a Total Force culture. Educate leaders
on critical thinking, and encourage them to recognize
and set aside parochial views that place their component’s well-being above that of the total Army.
CONCLUSION
As the Army confronts drastically reduced budgets
and a changing security environment, it is essential to
examine the challenges and requirements of having
an OR. These recommendations do not encompass all
of the issues that must be addressed to maintain the
OR or to better integrate the RC into a Total Force, but
they do provide a starting point.
Leaders of both the AC and RC must tackle these
critical issues. Frank discussion, lessened parochialism, and a willingness to make hard choices are essential. Otherwise, the OR may become a mere footnote
in the Army’s history.
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APPENDIX
INTEGRATION EXPERIENCES OF A
RESERVE COMPONENT UNIT ASSIGNED TO
AN ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND
This case study is based on the personal experiences of this monograph’s lead author, John Ellis.
He is a USAR colonel who is assigned as the Deputy
Commander, 9th MSC.

To understand some of the less obvious challenges
facing Reserve Component (RC) assigned to an Active
Component (AC) headquarters, a case study of the 9th
Mission Support Command (MSC) is presented. The
issues discussed herein are not intended as criticisms
of either the AC or RC. Rather, they are presented as
points of discussion to assist planners and decisionmakers when considering the future integration of active and reserve units as well as the restructuring of
the units into multicomponent formations.
BACKGROUND
The 9th Mission Support Command is a 3,500-member U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) unit assigned directly
to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), an Army Service
Component Command (ASCC) headquarters. The 9th
MSC receives its operational mission taskings from
USARPAC in an operational control mission command relationship, but nearly all of its resources come
from its RC headquarters, the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), which retains “shared administrative
control” over the unit. The 9th MSC leaders answer
to at least two different bosses, and there is some-
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times confusion in determining which headquarters’
taskings and policies will take precedence. In such a
situation, the unit’s standard operating procedure is
to implement the more stringent, but nonetheless, adherence to two different requirements can be difficult.
While the 9th MSC can be considered as an “outlier” because of its unique geographic and command
situation, its experiences are illustrative of what other
RC units will face as regional alignment takes place.
Following are some of the less obvious areas that present challenges for this operationally assigned unit.
Inclusion of RC leaders in the Planning/Operations
Processes.
USARPAC does a very good job of including its
Reserve components into theater campaign planning
and execution. Its primary RC unit, the 9th MSC, is
invited to all battle rhythm events, to include the highest-level command and staff conferences, battle update briefings, coordinating and special staff endeavors, and installation-oriented meetings. Part of the
challenge comes because the majority of these meetings are held Monday through Friday, when the 9th
MSC leaders are working at their civilian, not USAR,
jobs. Although there is a general understanding and
acceptance when full-time civilian and authorized
government representative (AGR) personnel have to
attend in the stead of the commander and his deputy,
the lower-ranking AGR personnel cannot necessarily
commit the command to certain requests. Information
and time are lost in the transmittal to the MSC commander, and the RC leaders’ input often comes after
the AC staff has pressed on and gained a decision.
However, we hasten to add that over the past 5 years,
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the integration of 9th MSC into USARPAC headquarters’ initiatives and efforts has increased markedly at
the senior and even the action officer levels. Most of
the challenges come from administrative and communications systems that tend to not address USAR
abilities to participate more fully.
Constant Education Process Regarding Usage and
Mobilization of RC Units.
As this monograph’s opening vignette illustrated,
there is sometimes a lack of understanding about how
RC units can be tasked and mobilized. RC personnel
must be diligent in training their AC headquarters on
mobilization procedures, time limitations, and RCspecific policies. They must also be honest in reporting
readiness levels. Although the RC’s widespread crossleveling of the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/Operation ENDURING FREEDOM mobilizations worked, it
would not be a viable practice for the long term.
Another area for education is the different timelines upon which AC and RC units must operate. Every area of administration and operations has myriad
examples of different timelines: completion of personnel evaluations, disciplinary actions, supply transfers,
line of duty investigations, mandatory training requirements, etc. The components must educate each
other on their timelines and make accommodation
where necessary to meet differing requirements.
The USARC is currently addressing this nearconstant educational challenge with deployments of
teams of AGR officers to assist the ASCC staff in the
planning and integration of Reserve forces into AC
operations in theater. These efforts are embryonic, and
it remains to be seen how effective they can be with
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the ASCC leadership. The first of these teams (known
as Army Reserve Engagement Cells) stood up in
August 2013.
Mission Command.
A question that often arises is, “Which headquarters is in charge? The operational headquarters (USARPAC) or the administrative headquarters (USARC)?”
Rather than being a turf war, this is a question that has
wide-ranging implications.
In the case of validating readiness, for example,
who will determine the readiness standards and
compliance? The common-sense answer might be the
operational headquarters, since they will be the ones
employing the 9th MSC. However, resourcing comes
from USARC, which definitely has a “vote” in what
training it can and will pay for. This can be a problem,
particularly if the USARPAC’s standards are more
“expensive” than what USARC can afford to provide.
Further, which headquarters should provide the
necessary predeployment guidance and standards?
From which headquarters will regionally aligned
forces (RAF) get their marching orders? Which headquarters will approve their mission analyses, training
METLs, and annual training plans?
Information Assurance Measures.
Many of USARPAC’s communications systems
and information security requirements hinder RC
inclusion. For example, the USARPAC LandWarNet
communications system will automatically delete
e-mail accounts for Soldiers who have not logged
into the computers at least once every 30 days. This
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happens routinely for some troop program unit
(TPU) drilling Soldiers, as battle assemblies may occur more than 30 days apart. Soldiers who are conducting training at a different location might also
miss the time frame. When this occurs, the Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA) is currently requiring a redefinition of the Soldier’s requirement
to possess an e-mail account, making the process
cumbersome.
Additionally, the USARPAC servers can only
be accessed from computers in and around the Fort
Shafter area or from 9th MSC unit locations in Guam,
Saipan, American Samoa, or Alaska. They cannot be
accessed from civilian or even other Department of
Defense (DoD) computers. This severely limits the
RC Soldier’s ability to keep up with USARPAC message traffic. A Reserve officer who has a civilian job
working at USPACOM could not, for example, access
USARPAC SharePoint pages and/or webmail via his
government computer during his lunch or after duty
hours. The 30-day log-on requirement has therefore
posed a real challenge to RC Soldiers who do not live
close to the unit.
Ironically, USARPAC’s LandWarNet is operated
by a multicomponent unit (although the e-mail system is, as mentioned, operated by DISA).
Healthcare.
Another example of limited integration is found in
the availability of healthcare services for 9th MSC Soldiers. Great strides have been made in the past decade
regarding RC Soldiers’ access to a viable and workable healthcare system. Nevertheless, the RC healthcare system does not match or compare to that of the
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AC. This impacts readiness levels when 9th MSC units
are compared to AC units, and the methods to achieve
higher medical and dental readiness require a much
greater deal of time, effort, and money to effect than
the AC requires.
In many cases, while 9th MSC’s RC Soldiers can get
(and pay for) Tricare insurance, they may live or be
posted in a place where there are no Tricare providers
available (like American Samoa or Saipan). Additionally, the RC Soldiers cannot receive medical or dental
screening or treatment at AC clinics unless they are on
orders lasting 30 days or more. This can be problematic for RC Soldiers living in Korea, Japan, Alaska, and
Guam, where U.S. medical facilities exist but are not
required to provide any care for these Soldiers.1
In those cases where medical or dental care is provided, RC Soldiers have a much lower priority. Granted, healthcare for the RC is one of the easiest areas to
justify cutting during austere times. Considering that
RC Soldiers want assurance that their post-deployment medical needs will be met (and preferably not
just by an already overburdened Veterans Administration); however, decisionmakers may want to find
ways to increase RC access to existing AC facilities.
SUMMARY
These examples are not cited to point fingers at
USARPAC’s systems or the mindset of its senior officers, for indeed, this command is arguably the most
integrated command of all the ASCCs. USARPAC and
the 9th MSC have made tremendous progress in integrating their AC and RC units. The concern is that
even with such forward-leaning leadership, the RC
integration for the rest of the Army will have to deal
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with similar situations. Aligning and integrating the
rest of the RC with the AC units they support will take
considerable planning and procedural changes.
Most importantly, the organizational cultures will
have to change to better adapt to the mix of AC and
RC operations. The AC must accept the strangeness of
the RC and its idiosyncratic procedures, at least until
the Army Total Force Policy takes practical and implementable effect. Likewise, the RC must understand
that it must truly adapt to the needs of the AC units it
supports—instead of often guessing what is required.
Until that happens, the “talk” of integrating the RC is
not matching the “walk” the RC faces each day.

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX
1. There has been progress in this regard, and RC Soldiers in
these areas now enjoy a small degree of access (for screening and
some smaller-scale treatment). This access has been the result of
“workarounds” and memorandums of agreement with the Pacific
Regional Medical Command leadership. Clinic commanders can
abruptly end the policy if it appears these facilities cannot meet
the demand of the AC and their dependents.
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